PUBLIC GOODS AND THE DISSOLUTION OF STATES

We present a simple model of the dissolution of states. We combine elements of the literature on the break‐up and integration of states based on models in the fiscal federalism tradition, with elements of the literature that explains the determination of a state's political institutions as a means to credibly promise redistributions in the face of costly, perhaps violent, redistributive conflict. We are able to characterize when the equilibrium involves the dissolution of a country, and when it involves continued unity. We are also able to explore some aspects of the linkages between political institutions and the determination of national boundaries.     

Modelling the Eurozone as an Extraordinary Exchange Rate Union

The Trans-European Automated Real-Time Gross settlement Express Transfer system (TARGET) imbalances within the Eurozone can be interpreted as a sign of a missing balance of payments adjustment mechanism for the member countries. As the Eurozone lacks a fiscal union, in theory it is more of an exchange rate union or a system of fixed exchange rates than a monetary union. This paper will show why the TARGET is a crucial indicator for the Eurozone not being a monetary union but instead an exchange rate union, and why countries holding TARGET liabilities against the European System of Central Banks can be compared to a reserve currency country, like the US under the Bretton-Woods System.     

Cultural patterns influencing project team behavior in Sub‐Saharan Africa: A case study in Ethiopia

Despite the increasing attention paid to the human element of project success found in the project management literature, empirical studies exploring cultural patterns influencing this particular human element continue to be far from satisfactory. To help further understand the influence of cultural patterns within Sub‐Saharan Africa project environments, we draw on a case study conducted in Ethiopia's service sector. Apart from the well‐perceived cultural values commonly referred to in the existing literature, we specifically investigated the deep‐rooted underlying causes, which include Ethiopian cultural habits, as a principal factor in influencing project team behavior. The article concludes with implications and recommendations for future research.     

Gesetzliche Rente: Bedeutet Teilhabeäquivalenz Verteilungsneutralität? — Ein weiterer Irrtum

A basic principle of statutory retirement insurance in Germany is the proportionality between earnings and retirement benefits called “Teilhabeäquivalenz”. Advocates of the system defend this principle, arguing that it ensures distributive neutrality. However, this assertion is wrong because the principle combines two concepts with different time dimensions: lifetime contributions and monthly retirement benefits. If clearly defined population groups differ in their life expectancy, then this very principle achieves income redistribution, in the German case from low earners to high earners. We propose a simple change in the rules which would avoid this undesirable redistribution.     

International order and individual liberty

This article takes issue with the traditional way of conceptualizing international relations as anarchy. While the “anarchy problematique” has become established wisdom of neorealist (structuralist) international relations theory, neither the historical record, nor the analytical power, of this approach is borne out by closer examination. The elimination of questions concerning individual liberty, and the exclusion from analysis of international and domestic institutions serving this end, have been pursued in the vain hope of formulating a systematic and parsimonious theory of international politics. p ]On the basis of an examination of the post-war era, in which issues of stable democratic regimes and liberal international institutions were of primary importance, this article suggests an alternative approach for the study of international politics. By conceptualizing both the domestic and international systems associal systems, differing in degree and kind of institutionalized behavior, particular attention is directed to the link between individual rights and domestic institutions, as well as to the linkage of domestic and international structures. The metaphor of a “game,” constituted by rules and norms, is particularly helpful in providing an alternative research program. This approach is not only more attuned to political practice, it also allows for the stringent examination of normative questions. In preparing this paper, I was helped by the support of the Liberty Fund and by my research assistant, Rey Koslowski. I also thank colleagues Joe Grieco, Joseph Nye, Michaela Richter, David Spiro as well as two anonymous referees of this journal who provided helpful suggestions. Lawrence B. Simon Professor of Political Science; University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6215.     

VOTING ON SOCIAL SECURITY WHEN LABOR SUPPLY IS ENDOGENOUS†

One of the puzzles in the political economic theory of unfunded pension systems is that middle-aged voters do not seem to advocate unlimited increases in the level of contributions and benefits if they take this decision to be valid forever. While the previous literature answered this question by pointing at borrowing restrictions, a more convincing explanation rests on the voters’understanding that future social security taxes will adversely affect future labor supply and thus the source from which their own pensions must be financed. This paper analyzes the validity of this explanation for two different types of pension systems, (a) the lump-sum benefits case, and (b) the case of fairness within cohorts.     

A GENERAL PROOF OF THE DYBVIG-INGERSOLL-ROSS THEOREM: LONG FORWARD RATES CAN NEVER FALL

A senera1 proof of the Dybvig-Ingersoll-Ross Theorem o n thc monotonicity of long foraard rates is presented. Some inconsistencies in the original proof o f this theorein are discussed.